Discussions of The Rationality of Perception and related work
Adam Pautz in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (Nov 2020)
My replies to commentaries by Adam Pautz, Peter Railton, and Errol Lord, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Nov 2020.
Santiago Flórez in Ideas Y Valores (2018)
Bence Nanay in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2019)
Casey O'Callaghan in Philosophical Review (2019)
Zachary C. Irving in Ratio (2019)
Frank Hofmann and Andy Orlando in Grazer Philosophische Studien (2019)
Alan Millar in Mind (2018)
Bill Brewer in Journal of Philosophy (2018)
Louise Richardson in European Journal of Philosophy (2018)
Dustin Stokes in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2018)
Ori Beck, Mazviita Chirimuuta, Raja Rosenhagen, Susanna Siegel, Declan Smithies, and Alison Springle in Analytic Philosophy (2018)
Andy Clark in Res Philosophica: “Priors and Prejudice” (2018)
Christopher Peacocke in Res Philosophica: “Are Perceptions Reached by Rational Inference?” (2018)
Replies to Clark and Peacocke in Res Philosophica: “Perception as Guessing vs. Perception as Knowing” (2018)
Endre Begby in Analysis Reviews: “Straight Thinking in Warped Environments” (2018)
Harmen Ghijsen in Analysis Reviews: “How to Explain the Rationality of Perception” (2018)
Katia Samoilova in Analysis Reviews: “Justification Upgrading and the Knowledge Baseline” (2018)
Replies to Begby, Ghijsen, and Samoilova in Analysis Reviews (2018)
Symposium with Adam Pautz, Errol Lord, and Peter Railton (coming soon)
Commentaries on earlier related work
Commentaries on “The Epistemic Impact of Etiology on Experience,” by Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrath in Philosophical Studies:
Richard Fumerton: “Siegel on the Epistemic Impact of ‘Checkered’ Experience” (2013)
Michael Huemer: “Epistemological Asymmetries Between Belief and Experience” (2013)
Matthew McGrath: “Siegel and the Impact for Epistemological Internalism (2013)
Commentaries on “Epistemic Charge” by Ori Beck, Mazviita Chirimuuta, Raja Rosenhagen, Declan Smithies & Alison Springle. Replies by Susanna Siegel. In Analytic Philosophy
A reply to “How Is Wishful Seeing Like Wishful Thinking?” by Robert Long
Related blog posts
Ethics in the World Book Talk
Cover design: Sandra Siegel. That’s my mother. She also painted the cover of The Contents of Visual Experience. See that book →
On a traditional conception of the human mind, reasoning can be rational or irrational, but perception cannot. Perception is simply a source of new information, and cannot be assessed for rationality or justification. I argue that this conception is wrong. Drawing on examples involving racism, emotion, self-defense law, and scientific theories, The Rationality of Perception makes the case that perception itself can be rational or irrational.
The Rationality of Perception argues that reasoning and perception are often deeply intertwined. When unjustified beliefs, fears, desires, or prejudices influence what we perceive, we face a philosophical problem: is it reasonable to strengthen what one believes, fears, or suspects, on the basis of an experience that was generated, unbeknownst to the perceiver, by those very same beliefs, fears, or suspicions? I argue that it is not reasonable — even though it may seem that way to the perceiver. In these cases, a perceptual experience may itself be irrational, because it is brought about by irrational influences.
This book makes vivid the far-reaching consequences of psychological and cultural influences on perception. Its method show how analytic philosophy, social psychology, history and politics can be mutually illuminating.